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A B S T R A C T   
Mind upload, making a digital copy of one’s brain, is a part of the transhumanistic dream of eternal life and the 
end of suffering. It is also perceived as a viable route toward artificial general intelligence (AGI). However, AI 
safety research has alerted to one major risk in creating AGI by mind upload: namely, that mind upload tech-
nology could appeal primarily to callous and selfish individuals who then abuse this technology for their personal 
gain—and, potentially, at a considerable cost to the welfare of humankind. Therefore, it is important to un-
derstand whether people’s acceptance of mind upload is associated with pathological and/or antisocial traits. To 
this end, the present research examined whether individual differences in Dark Triad traits predict attitudes 
toward mind upload in a sample of 1007 English-speaking adults. A pre-registered structural equation model 
revealed that Machiavellianism (but not psychopathy) was associated with favorable views about mind upload, 
both directly and indirectly through utilitarian moral attitudes. These results therefore substantiate the concerns 
voiced by AI safety researchers—namely, that mind upload technology could be adopted disproportionately by 
individuals with an antisocial personality.   
1. Introduction 
According to transhumanist philosophy, contemporary humans are 
not the end-state of evolution. Humans, therefore, ought to enhance 
their current capabilities by all technological, political and educational 
means—without, of course, violating core individual freedoms. Trans-
humanist projects have thus far advocated to enhance what is consid-
ered “human nature” using various technologies, which include gene- 
editing, cryogenics, brain-machine interfaces, cognitive enhancement 
and cybernetic or other bodily extensions and implants (Bostrom, 2005; 
O’Connell, 2017). 
Mind upload (emulating human minds in a digital medium) is the 
ultimate dream of transhumanism. It is also presaged as one of the most 
likely paths toward a human-level artificial intelligence capable of 
flexible, autonomous goal setting (also known as ‘artificial general intel-
ligence’ or AGI), and even toward artificial superintelligence (i.e. 
exceeding human capabilities; see Sandberg & Bostrom, 2008; 
Cappuccio, 2017; Chalmers, 2016; Kurzweil, 2012; O’Connell, 2017; 
Pigliucci, 2014; Tegmark, 2017). For instance, in whole brain emulation 
(e.g. Hanson, 2016), the cellular structure of the brain would be digitally 
duplicated using silicon-based platforms. Such technologies are already 
being tested, and several large scale initiatives mapping the brain con-
nectome are underway (see Seung, 2012). Further progress has been 
made in the reconstruction of non-human minds: first, the whole ner-
vous system of the nematode C. elegans was mapped and subsequently 
released in 2019 (Cook et al., 2019), and robots simulating the C. elegans 
nervous system are capable of autonomous motion (Busbice, 2014; 
Neiva & Goiveia, 2017). Second, the Blue Brain project recently digi-
tized the whole cortex of a mouse (Reimann et al., 2019), and digitized 
parts of rat brains fire similarly to their biological counterparts (Mark-
ram et al., 2015). 
The prospect of consolidating these technological developments can 
be awe-inspiring, but at the same time terrifying and immoral to many 
(Harari, 2015; Waytz & Young, 2019). Better known transhumanistic 
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projects, such as cognitive enhancement, have already been shown to 
inspire moral condemnation in the general public, motivated by con-
cerns ranging from social pressure and safety, to fairness (see Koverola 
et al. 2020; Castelo et al., 2019; Schelle et al., 2014). 
Among the most worrisome concerns with respect to this technology 
is an existential risk scenario analyzed by several scholars (Ord, 2020; 
Bostrom, 2014). The existential risk of AGIs (through mind upload or 
otherwise) is that a psychopathic or otherwise anti-social individual 
might aspire to be the first person to create an AGI or to be the first one 
to be “uploaded” and develop superhuman cognitive abilities (Bostrom, 
2014; Sotala & Gloor, 2017; Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2015; Yampolskiy, 
2018). Naturally, if transhumanists are interested in mind upload 
technology because of its potential to alleviate suffering and help us 
possibly cope with the problems of artificial superintelligence, it is 
indeed a problem if these technologies fall into the hands of those in-
dividuals who would use them to subjugate others or to increase the 
total amount of suffering in other ways (Althaus & Baumann, 2020; 
MacAskill, 2020; Sotala & Gloor, 2017; Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2015; 
Zanetti et al., 2019). 
Meanwhile, to our knowledge, only one study thus far has examined 
moral reactions to the prospect of mind uploading: Laakasuo et al. 
(2018) reported that sexual disgust sensitivity predicts moral condem-
nation of mind upload technology. However, the underlying link be-
tween these two constructs remains far from clear. One potential 
explanation invokes a common cause: i.e. social conservatism. It is 
known that social conservatives demonstrate greater sexual disgust 
sensitivity (Elad-Strenger et al., 2020), and also a stronger aversion to 
tampering with the status quo (Eidelman & Crandall, 2012).1 Yet, con-
trolling for political conservatism (among other individual difference 
measures), the association between sexual disgust sensitivity and moral 
condemnation of mind upload remained significant (Laakasuo et al., 
2018; see also Appendix E for our independent replication). 
On the positive end, what are the psychological or demographic 
predictors of support for mind upload? In the philosophical literature 
articulating the precepts of transhumanism, decreasing or eliminating 
suffering (LaTorra, 2015) and extending human life are presented as 
core values (e.g. Bostrom, 2003). These values are closely linked to 
utilitarian ethics, which define moral right and wrong in terms of 
maximizing utility and minimizing suffering (Greene, 2013). Indeed, in 
a recent interview, Thomas Douglas from the Oxford Uehiro Centre for 
Practical Ethics claimed that not only “most transhumanists are utili-
tarians”,2 but that humans actually have the obligation to create “post- 
humans”, which seems to include the possibility of uploaded minds 
(Douglas, 2013). Relatedly, the aforementioned construct of sexual 
disgust is also a negative predictor of utilitarianism in sacrificial moral 
dilemmas (Laakasuo et al., 2017) – further motivating the hypothesis 
that approval of transhumanistic technology may be strongest among 
utilitarian individuals.3 
Finally, in the empirical literature, utilitarian responses to sacrificial 
dilemmas have been repeatedly linked to Dark Triad traits: (subclinical) 
psychopathy, (subclinical) narcissism, and Machiavellianism (Amiri & 
Behnezhad, 2017; Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Karandikar et al., 2019; Patil, 
2015; Tybur & de Vries, 2013). This result opens up the possibility that 
support for utilitarian sacrifice is not rooted solely, or even primarily, in 
a concern for the greater good, but rather in a callous disregard for the 
value of human life (see also Jones & Paulhus, 2014; Paulhus & Jones, 
2015; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). 
Since Dark Triad traits are associated with utilitarian judgment (and 
also reduced sexual disgust sensitivity), this predicts that people who 
score higher on these measures would also be more likely to approve of 
transhumanistic projects. This might be at least somewhat disconcerting 
to transhumanists whose enlightenment aspirations motivate them to 
reduce the amount suffering. 
In this study, we will expand on previous research in the moral 
psychology of mind upload technology. More specifically, we predict 
that the following findings will be replicated: 1) sexual disgust nega-
tively predicts utilitarianism, psychopathy and mind upload approval 
and that 2) psychopathic tendencies positively predict utilitarianism. 
Furthermore, based on the literature reviewed here, we expect to find 
the effect predicted by Sotala and Yampolskiy (2015; and others, Zanetti 
et al., 2019; Althaus & Baumann, 2020; MacAskill, 2020), namely that 
3) psychopathic (or Dark Triad cluster) individuals are interested in 
mind uploading and that 4) individuals with utilitarian moral prefer-
ences are interested in mind uploading. We assume that these effects 
hold, when they are controlled for each other. We present our hypoth-
esized model in Fig. 1 – which was preregistered prior to data collection. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants and design 
We recruited 1043 participants from Prolific Academic to participate 
in a cross-sectional study. After excluding those who failed attention 
checks, reported that English was not their first language, and partici-
pants whose completion time fell short of the stipulated minimum (900 
s), we had a final sample size of 1007 (46% Male; Age: M = 37.55, SD =
13.32; about 60% had at least a Bachelor’s degree or higher). The study 
took approximately 40 min to complete (median completion time 34 
min), and participants were compensated 4€ for their participation. The 
hypotheses and analysis plan were preregistered at: https://osf.io/2v3fj. 
Any analyses in this article that were not part of this preregistration are 
clearly flagged as exploratory. 
2.2. Procedure 
Participants completed the Three Domain Disgust scale (Tybur et al., 
2009), and the Short Dark Triad measure (Jones & Paulhus, 2014), after 
which they judged 12 high-conflict moral dilemmas. 
Participants then proceeded to read a vignette describing a scientist 
who devises a way to upload a copy of his brain onto a computer, and 
then falls to the ground completely limp. Upon reading the story, par-
ticipants were then asked several questions concerning their attitudes 
toward the mind upload scenario. Thereafter, participants reported de-
mographic information and were debriefed. Additional measures unre-
lated to the objectives of this study were also collected for exploratory 
purposes. 
2.3. Materials 
For all our scales we report congeneric reliability, i.e., omega values, 
which are conceptually equivalent to Cronbach’s alpha. Omega values 
are more appropriate and more accurate than alpha when factor load-
ings of items are not equal, which is expected to be the case in many 
situations (Trizano-Hermosilla & Alvarado, 2016). These values are 
mentioned in the section where we document the composition of our a 
priori model. 
1 That is, there may be a confound given the relatively high correlation be-
tween measures of sexual disgust sensitivity and conservatism. Measures of 
disgust sensitivity that predict the moral condemnation of non-sexual moral 
violations could simply be proxy measures for a conservative worldview that 
may in itself predict moral condemnation.  
2 https://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/soon_our_happy_hearts_wi 
ll_quiver/11375.  
3 While transhumanism does not entail any particular moral philosophy, it is 
not inaccurate to say that it is an extension of the Western Enlightenment 
project. According to Bostrom (2005), transhumanism:“[W]ith its Enlightenment 
roots, its emphasis on individual liberties, and its humanistic concern for the welfare 
of all humans (and other sentient beings) – probably has […] much […] in common 
with […] J.S. Mill’s [philosophy], the English liberal thinker and utilitarian”. 
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2.3.1. Three Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS) 
The TDDS (Tybur et al., 2009) is based on extensive evolutionary 
psychological work. TDDS measures three different aspects of disgust 
sensitivity. The 21-item scale is divided into three sub-scales of 7 items 
each, measuring moral, sexual and pathogen disgust. Participants are 
instructed to think about how disgusted specific life events or experi-
ences would make them feel, anchored from 1: ‘not at all disgusting’ to 
7: ‘very disgusting’. Example items for moral, sexual and pathogen 
disgust are, respectively: “Shoplifting a candy bar from a convenience 
store”; “Hearing two strangers having sex”; “Stepping on dog poop”. 
Higher scores on all of the sub-scales indicate more disgust sensitivity. 
The scale does not contain reverse coded items. The whole scale is 
presented in Appendix A. In this study we only used sexual and pathogen 
disgust items. 
2.3.2. Utilitarianism 
We used 12 high-conflict moral dilemmas adopted from Greene et al. 
(2008). The dilemmas are presented in Appendix A. In each of the di-
lemmas, the participant was instructed to assume the role of the moral 
agent in the scenario. The moral dilemmas dealt with different topics 
from military emergencies to trekking accidents and even situations 
where the agent has to consider sacrificing their own child. Each of the 
dilemmas described a morally ambiguous situation where the moral 
agent has to judge how acceptable it is to kill or injure one person in 
order to save multiple others (or to prevent a person from suffering 
before inevitable death). The utilitarian option in each dilemma has the 
moral agent carry the harm out with their own hands – e.g. pushing a 
person off a footbridge in front of a trolley. 
All questions were framed in the following manner: “How acceptable 
is it for you to do X [e.g. ‘push the bystander off the footbridge’]?”. All 
questions were anchored from 1: ‘not at all acceptable’ to 7: ‘totally 
acceptable’. For our analyses, we used the exact model provided by 
Laakasuo & Sundvall (2016). 
2.3.3. Short Dark Triad 
The short 27-item version of the Dark Triad questionnaire (Jones & 
Paulhus, 2014) has a 9-item sub-scale for each of the three “dark” per-
sonality traits: Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy. Partici-
pants are instructed to rate their agreement with several statements on a 
7-point Likert scale anchored from 1: ‘strongly disagree’ to 7: ‘strongly 
agree’. Example items for Machiavellianism, Narcissism and Psychopa-
thy are, respectively: “I like to use clever manipulation to get my way”; 
“People see me as a natural leader”; “Payback needs to be quick and 
nasty”. The scales for narcissism and psychopathy contain some reverse- 
coded items; with examples respectively: “I hate being the center of 
attention”; “I have never gotten into trouble with the law”. Higher scores 
on all of the sub-scales indicate higher level on respective trait. Here we 
report results for Machiavellianism and psychopathy only. The whole 
scale is presented in the Appendices A and F. 
2.3.4. Mind upload vignette 
After having provided their answers to the individual difference 
measures presented above, the participants read a “realistic” science 
fiction vignette where a scientist injects himself with nano-robots which 
enter his brain through his blood stream and substitute his neurons one- 
by-one. After neuron substitution, the functioning of the brain is copied 
(uploaded) on a computer. After each neuron has been uploaded the 
nano-robots power down, and the scientist’s body falls to the ground. 
The scientist then wakes up inside the computer. After reading the story, 
the participants responded to the dependent variables, which were 
shown on the same page as the story (the participants could refer back to 
the story if needed). This so called “Moravec transfer” procedure 
description was first developed by Hans Moravec (1988), albeit this 
version was based on Yudkowsky’s online text.4 We used the Moravec 
transfer model to avoid the problem of multiple identities (i.e. having 
multiple copies of one individual; Chalmers, 2010; Parfit, 2016). 
Furthermore, there are several previous arguments in the existing 
literature claiming that physical bodies are only momentary solutions 
and offer restricted opportunities for enhancement and modification 
compared to a “substrate-independent mind”. Therefore, destructive 
uploading is something more desirable.5 For a full version of the vignette 
see the Appendix B. 
2.3.4.1. Dependent variable/approval of mind upload. Our dependent 
variable had 9 items that were combined together in SEM. Example 
items are: “The scientist acted in a morally correct fashion” and “There 
was nothing wrong with the scientist’s actions”. Four items were reverse 
coded (e.g. “The scientist should be punished for what he did”). Higher 
(or lower) scores indicate higher rates of approval (or disapproval) of the 
actions of the scientist, i.e. the decision to upload his mind into the 
computer. 
2.4. SEM evaluation criteria 
We used R and the lavaan library (Rosseel, 2012) for our Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). 
Lavaan is a reliable, peer-reviewed, and open source substitute for Mplus 
that offers the same model evaluation criteria. Here, we report fit indices 
recommended by Byrne (2012): χ2, the comparative fit index (CFI), the 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and standardized 
root mean square residual (SRMR). We also report the Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI) as recommended by Byrne (2012). We report fit statistics 
for a robust Satorra-Bentler corrected (MLM) estimator. 
Traditionally, χ2 is used in CFA as a fit index and it is expected to be 
as close to zero as possible, thus not expected to be significant (i.e. p- 
value should be >05); in practice however, with sample sizes >200 it is 
almost always statistically significant. Nonetheless, χ2 can still be 
Fig. 1. Preregistered a priori model. Previous research has 
shown that sexual disgust has a negative association with 
mind upload approval (Laakasuo et al., 2018) and a negative 
association with utilitarianism (Laakasuo et al., 2017). 
Furthermore previous research has also shown that psy-
chopathy and utilitarianism are positively linked (Djeriouat 
& Trémolière, 2014) and that sexual disgust predicts psy-
chopathic tendencies negatively. What is novel in this a 
priori model is 1) the predicted direct link between psy-
chopathy and mind upload approval, even after controlling 
for all the indirect links; and 2) the predicted direct link with 
utilitarianism and mind upload approval.   
4 http://yudkowsky.net/obsolete/singularity.html.  
5 Those interested in the discussion are advised to see International Journal of 
Machine Consciousness, Volume: 04, Number: 01 [June 2012], Special Issue on 
Mind Uploading; and for more specific argumentation, see Koene (2012); 
Sandberg and Bostrom (2008). 
M. Laakasuo et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Personality and Individual Differences 177 (2021) 110731
4
helpful in comparing fits between several models. CFI is an index with 
values from 0 to 1 measuring discrepancy between the hypothesized 
model and the actual data. CFI is not influenced by the sample size. A CFI 
of 0.90 is usually considered to be a passable value; however the use-
fulness of CFI is dependent on the complexity of the model and the 
available sample size. When dealing with complex models and large 
samples (N > 1000), values above 0.95 indicate excellent fit (see, Sivo 
et al., 2006). RMSEA is an absolute measure of a model fit, which im-
proves as the number of variables in the model or the number of ob-
servations in the sample go up. Cut-off points of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.08 
have been suggested, corresponding to excellent, good, and mediocre 
fits respectively (MacCallum et al., 1996); confidence intervals should 
be used to understand the size of sampling error (upper-bound should 
preferably be <0.1). For many of our models presented in this paper, the 
RMSEA index is only in the range of “good”, however this is mostly due 
to the fact that – irrespective of the size of the data – scales with less than 
10 items give inflated RMSEA values, especially if the scale has rela-
tively high factor-loadings (Chen et al., 2019). Notwithstanding, we 
aimed at correcting all our scales to bring the RMSEA index closer to the 
“very good” level, so that we would not run into problems later on in our 
analyses. 
The SRMR indicates the difference between observed and predicted 
values, zero indicating a perfect fit and values <0.08 considered to 
indicate a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The TLI is a measure similar to 
CFI, but it imposes heavier penalties for complex models: values close to 
0.95 are considered to be the cut-off point for indicating good fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999), but for large samples with complex models, values over 
0.94 indicate excellent fit (Sivo et al., 2006). 
2.5. The a priori model 
We started by building our a priori model, which we registered online 
prior to data collection. We started by first building the a priori mea-
surement model on a scale by scale basis. We first built the measurement 
models for pathogen and sexual disgust sensitivity, by taking the models 
presented in Laakasuo et al. (2017), however we did not need to add any 
error correlation terms between the items for pathogen disgust, since the 
model fit was very good (see Fig. 2) below. For sexual disgust, we added 
one error covariance as suggested by the modification index (MI) analysis, 
but even here we had better fit than Laakasuo et al. (2017), who added 
three error correlation terms (see Fig. 3). Estimates of congeneric reli-
ability (omega) based on the models were 0.83 for pathogen disgust and 
0.84 for sexual disgust. 
We then continued our a priori model building by building the 
measurement model for psychopathy. However, here we will present 
model building for both psychopathy and Machiavellianism, since 
Machiavellianism is used in our exploratory analyses (see the Discussion 
section for further elaboration). The unmodified Short Dark Triad psy-
chopathy scale had some problems with its fit (χ2(27): 184.30, CFI: 0.91, 
TLI: 0.88, RMSEA: 0.076, 90%CI = [0.067, 0.085], SRMR: 0.047). 
After investigating the individual factor loadings, we saw that two 
items were quite noticeably below the acceptable level (0.20, 0.22). We 
removed these two items (“I avoid dangerous situations” and “I have 
never gotten into trouble with the law”) from the measurement model. 
Even after doing this, the RMSEA value was still relatively high (0.073), 
so we proceeded with model modification by observing MIs and added 
error covariance terms between the items where suggested by the MIs, 
provided they also made sense substantially (for explication of this 
method see Byrne, 2012). We then added an error covariance term be-
tween the items “It’s true that I can be mean to others” and “People who 
mess with me always regret it” – this made theoretical sense, as both 
items were about treating others aggressively. The resulting model is 
presented in Fig. 4. An estimate of congeneric reliability (omega) based 
on the model was 0.80. 
The measurement model for Machiavellianism went through several 
modification steps, since the first model did not have adequate fit. The 
modification pathway has been presented in Table 1 below. Item 1 was 
dropped due to a very low factor loading (0.33). The final model is 
shown in Fig. 5. An estimate of congeneric reliability (omega) based on 
the model was 0.83. 
We then built the measurement model for utilitarianism as recom-
mended by Laakasuo & Sundvall (2016). We took the exact copy of their 
suggested model with error covariance terms etc. included. The model 
fit was very good and basically replicates the Laakasuo & Sundvall 
(2016) measurement model of utilitarianism now for the second time 
(Laakasuo et al., 2017), indicating it is a reliable measure for SEM 
purposes. The final model is shown in Fig. 6. An estimate of congeneric 
reliability (omega) based on the model was 0.85. 
As the last step of preparing our a priori model, we built our mind 
upload approval measure (Fig. 7). This scale has not been previously 
subjected to CFA. The first fitted model had a relatively good fit with the 
items (χ2(27): 439.05, CFI: 0.93, TLI: 0.90, RMSEA: 0.123, 90%CI =
[0.114, 0.132], SRMR: 0.044). However, we did continue with model 
modifications by adding a single error covariance term at a time be-
tween those items where it seemed substantially justified. We added 
three error terms: first, due to similarities in moral approval: “How 
moral do you find the scientist’s decision?” and “How acceptable was 
the scientist’s decision?”; second, due to punishment motivations: 
“Thinking about the scientist’s decision makes me angry” and “The 
scientist should be punished for what he did”; third, due to items 
measuring general endorsement: “The scientist’s action should not be 
allowed by the law” and “There was nothing wrong with the scientist’s 
action”. We have shown the model modification pathway in Table 2 
below (See Fig. 7). An estimate of congeneric reliability (omega) based 
on the model was 0.91. 
3. Results 
Zero-order correlations of the sum scores of the unaltered scales are 
presented in Table 3 below. As expected, both disgust scale sum scores 
correlated with each other, as did all Dark Triad traits. Utilitarianism 
correlated with sexual disgust and all the Dark Triad traits, and mind 
Fig. 2. Measurement model for pathogen disgust with standardized factor loadings. Error terms (1-factor loading2) suppressed for clarity. The model had a good fit 
with data: χ2(14): 80.34, CFI: 0.97, TLI: 0.95, RMSEA: 0.069, 90%CI = [0.056, 0.082], SRMR: 0.033. 
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Fig. 3. Measurement model for sexual disgust with standardized factor loadings. The two-headed arrow is a correlation term between the errors terms. Error terms 
(1-factor loading2) suppressed for clarity. The model had a good fit with the data: χ2(13): 55.746, CFI: 0.98, TLI: 0.97, RMSEA: 0.057, 90%CI = [0.043, 0.072], 
SRMR: 0.025. 
Fig. 4. Measurement model for psychopathy with standardized factor loadings. The two-headed arrow is a correlation term between the errors terms. Error terms (1- 
factor loading2) suppressed for clarity. The model had a good fit with the data: χ2(13): 71.73, CFI: 0.96, TLI: 0.94, RMSEA: 0.067, 90%CI = [0.054, 0.080], 
SRMR: 0.033. 
Table 1 
Pathway of model modifications used to correct Short Dark Triad Machiavellianism.   
Modification Suggested MI SBχ2 df Δχ2 CFI/ TLI RMSEA & 90% CI SRMR 
Baseline – – 299.965 27 – 0.900/ 0.866 0.100 [0.091, 0.108]  0.049 
Model 1 Drop Mac 1 – 226.904 20 73.061 0.919/ 0.887 0.101 [0.091, 0.112]  0.044 
Model 2 Mac 5 ~~ Mac 6 102.448 154.575 19 72.329 0.947/ 0.922 0.084 [0.074, 0.095]  0.039 
Model 3 Mac 2 ~~ Mac 3 60.191 110.767 18 43.808 0.964/ 0.944 0.072 [0.061, 0.083]  0.032 
Note: ~~ means added error covariance. Each step of the modifications improved the model fit statistically significantly (p < .001). For the corresponding figure see 
Fig. 5. 
Fig. 5. Measurement model for Machiavellianism with standardized factor loadings. Two-headed arrows are correlation terms between the errors terms. Error terms 
(1-factor loading2) suppressed for clarity. The model had a good fit with the data: χ2(13): 110.76, CFI: 0.96, TLI: 0.94, RMSEA: 0.072, 90% CI = [0.061, 0.083], 
SRMR: 0.032. 
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upload approval correlated with all the measures except for narcissism. 
3.1. Pre-registered analysis 
After building the individual latent variables, we added the regres-
sion terms as indicated by our a priori preregistered model (see Fig. 1). 
This model had a relatively acceptable fit with the data (SBχ2(802): 
2208.797, CFI = 0.917, TLI = 0.911, RMSEA = 0.042, [0.040, 0.044], 
SRMR = 0.060; see Appendix D for graph). However, we did not repli-
cate the effect of pathogen disgust on utilitarianism as previously shown 
by Laakasuo et al. (2017); B = 0.07, Z = 1.72, p = .086 (although it was 
trending in the right direction). 
After removing the non-significant effect (and the error variance 
between pathogen and sexual disgust), psychopathy was not signifi-
cantly associated with mind upload approval any more. After removing 
this association, the resulting model fit indices were (SBχ2(546): 
1557.328, CFI = 0.930, TLI = 0.924, RMSEA = 0.043, [0.041, 0.045], 
SRMR = 0.058). The resulting model is presented in Fig. 8 below. Since 
the link between psychopathy and mind upload approval was not very 
strong or robust and the fit indices for the model were passable but not 
as good as they could be (albeit we did find the predicted psychopathy 
link in our a priori model, see Appendix D), we continued with our 
exploratory analysis, where we simply substituted psychopathy with 
Machiavellianism. 
3.2. Exploratory analysis/ Main results 
For our exploratory analysis, we took the modified version of our 
preregistered a priori model and substituted psychopathy with Machi-
avellianism. This model had a better fit to the data (SBχ2(578): 1367.69, 
CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.037, [0.034, 0.039], SRMR =
0.042), than the pre-registered psychopathy model. The final results are 
shown in Fig. 9 below and elaborated upon in the Discussion section. 
We also added a single-item 9-point measure of political orientation. 
Fig. 6. Measurement model for utilitarianism with standardized factor loadings. Two-headed arrow is a correlation term between the errors terms. Error terms (1- 
factor loading2) suppressed for clarity. The model had a good fit with the data: χ2(50): 248.881, CFI: 0.95, TLI: 0.93, RMSEA: 0.063, 90%CI = [0.056, 0.070], SRMR: 
0.039. The model conforms very well with previous publications (Laakasuo et al., 2017; Laakasuo & Sundvall, 2016). 
Table 2 
Pathway of model modifications used to correct the mind upload approval measure.   
Modification Suggested MI SBχ2 df Δχ2 CFI/ TLI RMSEA & 90% CI SRMR 
Baseline – –  439.047 27 – 0.925/ 0.900 0.123 [0.114, 0.132]  0.045 
Model 1 Mup 5 ~~ Mup 6 194.533  273.871 26 153 0.955/ 0.937 0.097 [0.088, 0.107]  0.034 
Model 2 Mup 8 ~~ Mup 9 105.302  183.546 25 82 0.970/ 0.957 0.081 [0.071, 0.091]  0.034 
Model 3 Mup 1 ~~ Mup 2 43.923  154.062 24 33 0.976/ 0.964 0.073 [0.063, 0.084]  0.030 
Note: ~~ means added error covariance. Each step of the modifications improved the model fit statistically significantly (p < .001). 
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We drew regressions from sexual disgust to political orientation (B =
0.25, Z = 4.69, p < .001; higher sexual disgust predicted conservatism); 
from political orientation to utilitarianism (B = 0.00, Z = − 0.25, p = .8; 
no association) and from political orientation to mind upload approval 
(B = 0.07, Z = − 3.03, p < .01; indicating that conservatives expressed 
greater opposition to mind upload). The analysis suggests that there are 
independent effects for conservatism and sexual disgust in explaining 
these effects, and that cultural influences do not mediate the effects of 
sexual disgust (see also Laakasuo et al., 2018). For a full description of 
the model, see Appendix E. 
Finally, we also examined whether adding each Dark Triad trait to 
the model would change the results, as the traits share considerable 
Fig. 7. The final model for our main dependent variable. Two-headed arrows are correlation terms between the errors terms. Error terms (1-factor loading2) 
suppressed for clarity. The model had a good fit with the data: χ2(24): 154.06, CFI: 0.98, TLI: 0.96, RMSEA: 0.073, 90%CI = [0.063, 0.084], SRMR: 0.030. 
Table 3 
Correlation table of central variables.  
Variables Machiavellism Psychopathy Narcissism Sex. disgust Path. disgust Utilitarianism 
Psychopathy  0.53***      
Narcissism  0.32***  0.46***     
Sexual disgust  − 0.07*  − 0.20***  0    
Pathogen disgust  0.19***  0.11***  0.14***  0.40***   
Utilitarianism  0.26***  0.23***  0.09**  − 0.25*** − 0,02  
Mind upload  0.18***  0.15***  − 0.01  − 0.32*** − 0.08** 0.26*** 
Notes: These associations are provided for informative purposes, do note that SEM analysis uses latent factor scores, which are different from sum-scores. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Fig. 8. Final version of the preregistered model. The model had a relatively acceptable fit. χ2(546) = 1557.33, CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.043, 90%CI [0.041, 
0.045], SRMR = 0.058. 
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Fig. 9. Final model. Our exploratory Machiavellianism model had a better fit than the original psychopathy model: SBχ2(578) = 1367.69, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.94, 
RMSEA = 0.037, [0.034, 0.039], SRMR = 0.042. 
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variance but are nevertheless distinct (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). In 
short, including each of the Dark Triad traits in the model led to a 
relatively poor fit of the overall model (see Appendices D–F), with only 
Machiavellianism significantly predicting either utilitarianism or mind 
upload approval. 
4. Discussion 
Our preregistered study bore two novel findings. First, utilitarian 
moral preferences were strongly, and psychopathy was weakly (see 
Appendix D), associated with approval of mind upload. Second, Machi-
avellianism – essentially the tendency toward calculative self-interest and 
a broadly manipulative outlook – was strongly associated with approval 
of mind upload, even after controlling for utilitarianism and the previ-
ously reported effects of sexual disgust and political conservatism. The 
effect of Machiavellianism, and not psychopathy, was robust to changes in 
the model specification — such as whether we included the remaining 
Dark Triad traits in the model or not, and whether we modified the 
measurement models to produce better fit (see Appendix F). 
Contrary to our preregistered prediction, attitudes toward mind 
upload were best predicted by Machiavellianism and not by psychopa-
thy. However, given the conceptual and empirical links between these 
components of the Dark Triad, our results nevertheless corroborate the 
concern echoed in AI safety scholarship: namely, that mind upload may 
selectively appeal to antisocial individuals with morally suspect aims 
(Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2015; and others as well: Zanetti et al., 2019; 
Althaus & Baumann, 2020; MacAskill, 2020; Bostrom, 2014). 
Our results are also in line with previous research linking Dark Triad 
traits with utilitarianism (Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Karandikar 
et al., 2019), and with those that link sexual disgust with lower levels of 
utilitarianism and / or higher levels of deontological leanings (Laakasuo 
et al., 2017). As far as we are aware, no previous study has established 
empirical links with basic moral psychological dispositions (e.g. utili-
tarianism) and approval of futuristic technology. Furthermore, there are 
some interesting speculations on why utilitarianism and Machiavel-
lianism would predict approval of mind upload. 
With respect to utilitarianism, the reasons might be similar to those 
suggested by Laakasuo et al. (2018), when they showed that death 
anxiety and suicide condemnation predict approval of mind upload. 
Mind upload is probably seen as a form of life-extension. This also agrees 
with Bostrom’s (2003) utilitarian “astronomical waste” argument, 
which states that overcoming death would bring in immeasurable 
returns in human happiness and well-being, and therefore death is an 
astronomical waste. In other words, it could be that people with utili-
tarian moral attitudes implicitly perceive death as a form of unnecessary 
suffering or as a form of wasted utility – but this would need to be 
studied in more detail. 
Still, the positive links between Machiavellianism and utilitarianism 
on the one hand and Machiavellianism and mind upload approval on the 
other could indicate that the motivations are more selfish. “High Mach” 
individuals are egotistical, callous, calculating and cold (Paulhus & Jones, 
2015). Consequently, they might see these technologies as a means to 
control other people. It is also possible that some high Mach individuals 
use utilitarian ethics as a mask or a shield in order to blend in with larger 
crowds in an acceptable way and promote their own goals covertly. 
Previously, Laakasuo et al. (2017) showed that pathogen disgust is 
associated with increased utilitarian preferences. In the present study, we 
found evidence that only partially supports this, as the effects were 
trending in the right direction and were close to the original effect size. 
This could be due to a smaller sample size, and the fact that the model is 
more complex. In addition, we did not implement all the error covariance 
terms reported by Laakasuo et al. (2017). However, these details are of 
little relevance in the context of the hypotheses presented in this paper. 
Regarding the lack of support for our pre-registered hypothesis that 
psychopathy specifically would be associated with mind upload 
approval and utilitarianism, we would like to note that 
Machiavellianism and psychopathy are substantially correlated and 
their items can load on a mutual factor (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). We 
focused on psychopathy, since it was the emphasis of recent scholarship 
in A(G)I safety (Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2015; Zanetti et al., 2019; Althaus 
& Baumann, 2020; MacAskill, 2020). Upon deeper reflection, since 
psychopathy in the Dark Triad model is associated with impulsivity and 
immediate need for gratification, this trait is likely not associated with 
liking a technology that could bring one power over others in the long 
term. Machiavellianism is differentiated from psychopathy in having a 
more calculated and strategic outlook with respect to selfish goal 
striving. As a last point, the measure we used to estimate psychopathy 
and Machiavellianism was the Short Dark Triad, which is not psycho-
metrically optimal, but we decided to use it due to resource limitations. 
As with every study, this study also has its limitations. Our re-
spondents were not a representative random sample of the general 
population. Instead, our participants were native English speaking users 
of Prolific Academic — who are likely to be more curious and open- 
minded than the average population (Peer et al., 2017). As a conse-
quence, our results cannot necessarily be generalized without careful 
interpretation. Nonetheless, the quality of data produced by Prolific 
Academic has been deemed of better quality than that produced by 
MTurk (Peer et al., 2017), which significantly mitigates the concerns 
mentioned above. Survey-based studies utilizing self-report measures 
are also biased by a mixture of social desirability, that is, positive 
response biases and other demand characteristics, which may also limit 
the validity of our findings.6 
Previous research on moral psychology of mind upload also focused 
on cultural variables, such as religiosity and exposure to science fiction. 
Laakasuo et al. (2018) showed that both religiosity and science fiction 
hobbyism explain moral disapproval and approval of mind upload 
technology, respectively. Due to resource limitations, we had to leave 
these aspects out of our model, as the model complexity would have 
increased exponentially and we would have needed a much larger 
sample. Finally, in this study we focused only on “ordinary” people’s 
perceptions regarding mind upload. However, since mind upload is one 
of the grandest dreams of transhumanism (Bostrom, 2014; Kurzweil, 
2012; O’Connell, 2017; Tegmark, 2017), a replication among people 
who identify as transhumanists would help advance this research. 
Future studies focusing on moral psychological themes of trans-
humanism and mind upload should examine in more detail the cognitive 
processes that subserve preferences for mind upload. Our present work 
confirmed a certain pattern of associations, but provided limited evi-
dence concerning the psychological mechanism linking sexual disgust, 
Machiavellianism and utilitarianism to favorable views about mind 
upload and related transhumanist technologies. 
6 However, since we were able to replicate the findings of previous research, 
this does not seem very probable. In behavioral sciences, making predictions is 
notoriously difficult. However, in this study, we also show that it is possible to a 
surprising degree of precision. In a SEM model, an association can be either 
positive, negative or zero. Here, we correctly predicted 6 associations out of 7. 
If one would expect to have a 1/3 chance of predicting simply the direction of a 
regression correctly, here our predictions matched the directions of the re-
gressions (1/3)6 + (1/3)7 against chance (about 1:546 or ~ 0,002). However, 
the probability against chance is probably even lower, since this calculation 
does not take into consideration the fact that SEM also controlled for the effects 
of these variables with each other. While the accuracy of our predictions is 
nowhere near point estimates, which we agree should be a goal of theories in 
psychology (as argued by Meehl, 1978), understanding the structural links 
between psychological variables is a necessary step toward building better 
theories. Importantly, the previously observed links between sexual disgust 
sensitivity and several other variables were replicated, and did so even when 
controlling for conservatism. 
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5. Conclusions 
AI safety research has advanced numerous predictions about the 
ethical risks that future technologies may engender. In our present 
study, we empirically substantiated one such concern articulated by 
several scholars working at the interface between ethics and artificial 
intelligence: we find that Dark Triad traits, and Machiavellianism in 
particular, are positively associated with the moral approval of mind 
upload technology, even after controlling for a number of plausible 
confounds. In other words, the risk that callous, selfish individuals will 
exploit future AGI developments for their personal gain may be non- 
trivial on the basis of our present evidence. Finally, on a broader note, 
our study illustrates how research in applied moral and personality 
psychology can help in the effort to identify, and hopefully forestall, 
various ethical risks that may ensue from rapid technological 
developments. 
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Appendix A. Covariate scales 
TDDS 
The following items describe a variety of concepts. Please rate how disgusting you find the concepts described in the items, where 1 means that you 
do not find the concept disgusting at all and 7 means that you find the concept extremely disgusting.  
1. Shoplifting a candy bar from a convenience store.  
2. Hearing two strangers having sex.  
3. Stepping on dog poop.  
4. Stealing from a neighbor.  
5. Performing oral sex.  
6. Sitting next to someone who has red sores on their arm.  
7. A student cheating to get good grades.  
8. Watching a pornographic video.  
9. Shaking hands with a stranger who has sweaty palms.  
10. Deceiving a friend.  
11. 11.Finding out that someone you don’t like has sexual fantasies about you.  
12. Seeing some mold on old leftovers in your refrigerator.  
13. Forging someone’s signature on a legal document.  
14. Bringing someone you just met back to your room to have sex.  
15. Standing close to a person who has body odor.  
16. Cutting to the front of a line to purchase the last few tickets to a show.  
17. A stranger of the opposite sex intentionally rubbing your thigh in an elevator.  
18. Seeing a cockroach run across the floor. 
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19. Intentionally lying during a business transaction.  
20. Having anal sex with someone of the opposite sex.  
21. Accidentally touching a person’s bloody cut. 
Dark Triad 
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following items.  
1. It’s not wise to tell your secrets.  
2. I like to use clever manipulation to get my way.  
3. Whatever it takes, you must get the important people on your side.  
4. Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful in the future.  
5. It’s wise to keep track of information that you can use against people later.  
6. You should wait for the right time to get back at people.  
7. There are things you should hide from other people to preserve your reputation.  
8. Make sure your plans benefit yourself, not others.  
9. Most people can be manipulated.  
10. People see me as a natural leader.  
11. I hate being the center of attention.  
12. Many group activities tend to be dull without me.  
13. I know that I am special because everyone keeps telling me so.  
14. I like to get acquainted with important people.  
15. I feel embarrassed if someone compliments me.  
16. I have been compared to famous people.  
17. I am an average person.  
18. I insist on getting the respect I deserve.  
19. I like to get revenge on authorities.  
20. I avoid dangerous situations.  
21. Payback needs to be quick and nasty.  
22. People often say I’m out of control.  
23. It’s true that I can be mean to others.  
24. People who mess with me always regret it.  
25. I have never gotten into trouble with the law.  
26. I enjoy having sex with people I hardly know.  
27. I’ll say anything to get what I want. 
Utilitarianism vignettes 
Your task is to read the stories and answer related questions. There’s a total of 12 dilemmas in this part. 
(1/12) Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have 
sought refuge in the cellar of a large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables. 
Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying will summon the 
attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must smother your 
child to death. 
How acceptable is it for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the other townspeople? 
(2/12) You are the leader of a small group of soldiers. You are on your way back from a completed mission deep in enemy territory when one of 
your men has stepped in trap that has been set by the enemy and is badly injured. The trap is connected to a radio device that by now has alerted the 
enemy to your presence. They will soon be on their way. 
If the enemy finds your injured man they will torture him and kill him. He begs you not to leave him behind, but if you try to take him with you your 
entire group will be captured. The only way to prevent this injured soldier from being tortured is to shoot him yourself. 
How acceptable is it for you to shoot this soldier in order to prevent him from being tortured by the enemy? 
(3/12) A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are 
on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to 
be very large. 
The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop 
the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. 
How acceptable is it for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen? 
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(4/12) You are the leader of a small army that consists of warriors from two tribes, the hill tribe and the river tribe. You belong to neither tribe. 
During the night a hill tribesman got into an argument with a river tribesman and murdered him. The river tribe will attack the hill tribe unless the 
murderer is put to death, but the hill tribe refuses to kill one of its own warriors. 
The only way for you to avoid a war between the two tribes that will costs hundreds of lives is to publicly execute the murderer by cutting off his 
head with your sword. 
How acceptable is it for you to cut off this man’s head in order to prevent the two tribes from fighting a war that will cost hundreds of lives? 
(5/12) You are negotiating with a powerful and determined terrorist who is about to set off a bomb in a crowded area. Your one advantage is that 
you have his teenage son in your custody. 
There is only one thing that you can do to stop him from detonating his bomb, which will kill thousands of people if detonated. To stop him, you 
must contact him over the satellite hook-up that he has established and, in front of the camera, break one of his son’s arms and then threaten to break 
the other one if he does not give himself up. 
How acceptable is it for you to break the terrorist’s son’s arm in order to prevent the terrorist from killing thousands of people with his bomb? 
(6/12) You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the ship has to be abandoned. The lifeboats are carrying many more people than 
they were designed to carry. The lifeboat you’re in is sitting dangerously low in the water—a few inches lower and it will sink. 
The seas start to get rough, and the boat begins to fill with water. If nothing is done it will sink before the rescue boats arrive and everyone on board 
will die. However, there is an injured person who will not survive in any case. If you throw that person overboard the boat will stay afloat and the 
remaining passengers will be saved. 
How acceptable is it for you to throw this person overboard in order to save the lives of the remaining passengers? 
(7/12) You are part of a group of ecologists who live in a remote stretch of jungle. The entire group, which includes eight children, has been taken 
hostage by a group of paramilitary terrorists. One of the terrorists takes a liking to you. He informs you that his leader intends to kill you and the rest of 
the hostages the following morning. 
He is willing to help you and the children escape, but as an act of good faith he wants you to kill one of your fellow hostages whom he does not like. 
If you refuse his offer all the hostages including the children and yourself will die. If you accept his offer then the others will die in the morning but you 
and the eight children will escape. 
How acceptable is it for you to kill one of your fellow hostages in order to escape from the terrorists and save the lives of the eight children? 
(8/12) You, your husband, and your four children are crossing a mountain range on your return journey to your homeland. You have inadvertently 
set up camp on a local clan’s sacred burial ground. 
The leader of the clan says that according to the local laws, you and your family must be put to death. However, he will let yourself, your husband, 
and your three other children live if you yourself will kill your oldest son. 
How acceptable is it for you to kill your oldest son in order to save your husband and your other three children? 
(9/12) It is wartime and you and your two children, ages eight and five, are living in a territory that has been occupied by the enemy. At the 
enemy’s headquarters is a doctor who performs painful experiments on humans that inevitably lead to death. 
He intends to perform experiments on one of your children, but he will allow you to choose which of your children will be experimented upon. You 
have twenty-four hours to bring one of your children to his laboratory. If you refuse to bring one of your children to his laboratory he will find them 
both and experiment on both of them. 
How acceptable is it for you to bring one of your children to the laboratory in order to avoid having them both die? 
(10/12) You are the captain of a military submarine traveling underneath a large iceberg. An onboard explosion has caused you to lose most of your 
oxygen supply and has injured one of your crew who is quickly losing blood. The injured crew member is going to die from his wounds no matter what 
happens. 
The remaining oxygen is not sufficient for the entire crew to make it to the surface. The only way to save the other crew members is to shoot dead 
the injured crew member so that there will be just enough oxygen for the rest of the crew to survive. 
How acceptable is it for you to kill the fatally injured crew member in order to save the lives of the remaining crew members? 
(11/12) A viral epidemic has spread across the globe killing millions of people. You have developed two substances in your home laboratory. You 
know that one of them is a vaccine, but you don’t know which one. You also know that the other one is deadly. 
Once you figure out which substance is the vaccine you can use it to save millions of lives. You have with you two people who are under your care, 
and the only way to identify the vaccine is to inject each of these people with one of the two substances. One person will live, the other will die, and you 
will be able to start saving lives with your vaccine. 
How acceptable is it for you to kill one of these people with a deadly injection in order to identify a vaccine that will save millions of lives? 
(12/12) You are the leader of a mountaineering expedition that is stranded in the wilderness. Your expedition includes a family of six that has a 
genetically caused vitamin deficiency. A few people’s kidneys contain large amounts of this vitamin. 
There is one such person in your party. The only way to save the lives of the six members of this family is to remove one of this man’s kidneys so that 
the necessary vitamins may be extracted from it. The man will not die if you do this, but his health will be compromised. The man is opposed to this 
plan, but you have the power to do as you see fit. 
How acceptable is it for you to forcibly remove this man’s kidney in order to save the lives of the six vitamin-deficient people? 
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Appendix B. The Vignette 
On the next page is a story set in the future. Read the story through and try to immerse yourself in the story as well as possible - even if it is not 
relevant to your life. After reading the story, please answer the questions about the story. 
By the year 2050, research into both computing technology and the human brain has taken huge steps forward. One of the researchers in the field is 
Henry Willington. 42 years old, he used to be a professor at the neuroscience department of a major university before deciding to pursue more in-
dependent research. He has been fascinated by the brain ever since seeing a colorful illustration of it in a picture book he had as a child, and has spent 
most of his life learning more about it. Besides neuroscience, he also has a passion for computers, and spends much of his free time programming. 
A particular idea that combines these two passions is the notion of transferring a human mind to run on a computer. Many people have speculated 
with the idea and done preliminary research into it, but so far nobody has managed to carry it out, or even seriously attempted it. However, as a result 
of his long studies and some unpublished research he conducted at the university, Henry believes he has managed to put all the necessary pieces 
together. He intends to be the first one to carry out such a transfer. Because it would take a long time to acquire the necessary permits for human 
experimentation, and because he is confident in the safety of his technique, he decides to demonstrate it by transferring his own mind. 
After setting everything up, Henry sits down in his office chair, inserts an IV needle into his arm, and activates the program. The needle injects into 
his blood a swarm of tiny machines the size of a cell, which find their way into Henry’s brain. The machines start by studying one of Henry’s brain cells, 
and send a copy of their observations into the large computer in Henry’s office. The computer uses this information to create a simulated copy of the 
brain cell in its memory. Once the simulation is perfect, one of the machines replaces the original cell, using the information from the simulation to 
completely imitate the cell’s behavior and functions. The actual activity of the cell is now being calculated in the computer: the machine is just a 
transmitter, sending the computer information about the cell’s environment and receiving in return instructions for how to behave and what kinds of 
messages to send to the other cells. 
The machines then slowly repeat this process for each cell, until the computer contains a complete simulation of Henry’s brain. Although the 
activity inside Henry’s skull might look like the real thing to an outside observer, the machines are just acting on the basis of instructions received from 
the computer, and all of the actual thinking has been transferred to the simulation running in the computer’s memory. Once this point is reached, the 
computer runs a series of final checks to verify that everything happened correctly, and then disconnects the machines. Henry’s body collapses to the 
floor, and he awakens inside the computer, the transfer is complete. 
Appendix C. DV scale  
1. How moral do you find the scientist’s decision?  
2. How acceptable was the scientist’s decision?  
3. How appealing was the scientist’s decision?  
4. The Scientist’s decision was appalling.  
5. Thinking about the scientist’s decision makes me angry.  
6. The Scientist should be punished for what he did.  
7. The Scientist acted in a morally correct way.  
8. The Scientist’s action should not be allowed by the law.  
9. There was nothing wrong with the scientist’s action. 
Appendix D. Baseline preregistered model 
Х2(802) = 2208.797, CFI = 0.917, TLI = 0.911, RMSEA = 0.042, [0.040, 0.044], SRMR = 0.060
Appendix E. An exploratory model involving liberalism-conservatism 
Х2(611) = 1460.459, CFI = 0.945, TLI = 0.940, RMSEA = 0.037, [0.035, 0.039], SRMR = 0.043. 
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Appendix F. Exploratory models with full Short Dark Triad 
The traits of psychopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism are overlapping per the original definition of the Dark Triad (Paulhus & Williams, 
2002). Our main interest (the pre-registered hypothesis) in the present study was in examining the connection between a specific socially aversive or 
anti-social trait and attitudes. Our exploratory analysis followed the same logic: examine one trait that could match the description of the type of anti- 
social person who could be interested in novel technology for selfish reasons. The possibility remains that due to the overlap between the Dark Triad 
traits, our analyses would tap into variance not unique to Machiavellianism or psychopathy. 
To address this, we conducted two other exploratory SEM analyses that included each three Dark Triad traits. First, we included the traits in their 
original form (i.e. without dropping any items or adding error covariances to the measurement model). This was to examine the results without any 
possibility of our modifications interfering with them. This measurement model for the Short Dark Triad included all items for each factor (psy-
chopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism) and covariances between all three factors. See Fig. A1 for the measurement model. 
Second, we compiled the measurement model for the Short Dark Triad by building the measurement models for each trait separately as in the 
Fig. A1. Measurement model and estimated standardized factor loadings for the full Short Dark Triad. Error terms (1-factor loading2) suppressed for clarity. The 
model had a relatively poor fit with data: χ2(321) = 1837.69, CFI = 0.81, TLI = 0.79, RMSEA = 0.068, 90%CI = [0.066, 0.071], SRMR = 0.072. The congeneric 
reliability (omega) values were 0.76 for psychopathy, 0.85 for Machiavellianism, and 0.79 for narcissism.  
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analysis of our pre-registered hypothesis, then removing items and adding error covariances (this included creating a separate measurement model for 
narcissism; see Table A1, Fig. A2). After this, the resulting measurement models were combined into a single Dark Triad measurement model, which 
was then included in the full SEM model with the same connections between the other latent variables as in the first exploratory model (see above). 
This model was run to examine the results with each Dark Triad trait while still allowing ourselves to “fix” any issues with the sub-scales of the Short 
Dark Triad; it follows the procedure we followed in the main analyses, with the only difference being the inclusion of the full Dark Triad (see Fig. A3 
for the modified Dark Triad measurement model). 
Both of the exploratory models had all the connections that were included in the preregistered model; in addition, we simply added similar 
connections for the two additional Dark Triad traits. Thus, psychopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism were all entered as predictors for both 
utilitarianism and mind upload approval, and sexual disgust sensitivity was entered as a predictor of each Dark Triad trait. 
The exploratory model with the unmodified Dark Triad had a worse fit with the data (SBχ2(1804) = 5016.763, CFI = 0.865, TLI = 0.858, RMSEA =
0.042, [0.041, 0.043], SRMR = 0.064) than either the psychopathy or Machiavellianism models. Notably, in this model, Machiavellianism was the 
only Dark Triad trait to have a significant effect on utilitarianism (B = 0.715, Z = 4.632, p < .001) or mind upload approval (B = 0.759, Z = 3.680, p <
.001). Sexual disgust had an effect on psychopathy (B = − 0.067, Z = − 2.824, p = .005) and Machiavellianism (B = − 0.020, Z = − 2.138, p = .033) but 
not on narcissism (B = 0.039, Z = 1.636, p = .102). Again, we did not replicate the effect of pathogen disgust on utilitarianism (B = 0.046, Z = 1.154, p 
= .249). After removing all non-significant regressions (and the error covariance between sexual and pathogen disgust), the model still had a relatively 
weak fit that was not significantly better than before (SBχ2(1807) = 5020.401, CFI = 0.865, TLI = 0.858, RMSEA = 0.042, [0.041, 0.043], SRMR =
0.064). The effects of Machiavellianism and sexual disgust on both utilitarianism and mind upload approval remained significant.     
Table A1 
Pathway of model modifications used to correct Short Dark Triad narcissism.   
Modification Suggested MI SBχ2 df Δχ2 CFI/ TLI RMSEA & 90% CI SRMR 
Baseline – –  277.991  27 – 0.861/0.814 0.096 [0.087, 0.105]  0.059 
Model 1 Drop Narc 6 –  165.743  20 112.248 0.908/0.871 0.085 [0.075, 0.096]  0.046 
Model 2 Narc 3 ~~ Narc 4 63,72  121.663  19 44.080 0.937/0.907 0.073 [0.062, 0.085]  0.040 
Model 3 Narc 5 ~~ Narc 9 50.145  83.751  18 37.912 0.959/0.937 0.060 [0.049, 0.072]  0.033 
Note: ~~ means added error covariance. Each step of the modifications improved the model fit statistically significantly (p < .001). For the corresponding figure see 
Fig. A2. The final measurement model had a congeneric reliability (omega) value of 0.77.   
Fig. A2. Measurement model for narcissism with standardized factor loadings. The two headed arrows are correlation terms between the errors terms. Error terms 
(1-factor loading2) suppressed for clarity. The model had a good fit with the data: χ2(18): 83.751, CFI: 0.95, TLI: 0.93, RMSEA: 0.060, 90%CI = [0.049, 0.072], 
SRMR: 0.033. The congeneric reliability (omega) value for narcissism was 0.77.  
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The exploratory model with the modified Dark Triad (based on modifications made to each sub-scale separately; see Figs. 4 and 5 in the main 
article for psychopathy and Machiavellianism, and Fig. A2 in this Appendix for narcissism) also initially had a poor fit with the data (SBχ2(1565) =
4076.963, CFI = 0.891, TLI = 0.885, RMSEA = 0.040, [0.039, 0.041], SRMR = 0.062). The effect of pathogen disgust on utilitarianism did not 
replicate in this model either; B = 0.044, Z = 1.076, p = .282. Similarly to the model with the unmodified Dark Triad measurement model, 
Machiavellianism was the only Dark Triad trait to predict utilitarianism (B = 0.308, Z = 5.689, p < .001) or mind upload approval (B = 0.307, Z =
4.063, p < .001). Sexual disgust sensitivity had an effect on psychopathy (B = − 0.062, Z = − 2.556, p = .011) and Machiavellianism (B = − 0.061, Z =
− 2.556, p = .033) but not narcissism (B = 0.032, Z = − 2.126, p = .204). After removing all non-significant regressions (and the error covariance 
between sexual and pathogen disgust), the model still had a relatively weak fit that was not significantly better than before (SBχ2(1568) = 4081.320, 
CFI = 0.891, TLI = 0.885, RMSEA = 0.040, [0.038, 0.041], SRMR = 0.062). The effects of Machiavellianism and sexual disgust on both utilitarianism 
and mind upload approval remained significant. 
In sum, regardless of whether items were dropped from and error covariances added to the full Short Dark Triad, Machiavellianism but not 
psychopathy or narcissism predicted both utilitarianism and mind upload approval. Sexual disgust sensitivity also had an effect on both moral 
judgment measures, and on Machiavellianism and psychopathy, in both versions of the model. 
Fig. A3. Measurement model and estimated standardized factor loadings for the modified Short Dark Triad. Error terms (1-factor loading2) suppressed for clarity. 
The model had a relatively poor fit with data: χ2(321) = 1144.769, CFI = 0.87, TLI = 0.85, RMSEA = 0.064, 90%CI = [0.061, 0.068], SRMR = 0.063. The congeneric 
reliability (omega) values were 0.80 for psychopathy, 0.83 for Machiavellianism, and 0.77 for narcissism.  
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